INTRODUCTION
In the literature on urban property rights and institutions, one main type of institutional structure is the integration of property owner and collective goods provider in the form of political or economic organizations Deng 2003a) , such as homeowners association, shopping malls, and even suburban local government (Fischel 2001) .
The implicit implication of this line of reasoning conforms to the residual theory (see, for example, Webster and Lai 2003) . On the other hand, diversity and externality's positive role has been emphasized, albeit rather separately from most formal theories, in the urban literature (Jacobs 1961 Open institutions could be found in a wide variety of fields and exhibit many different forms. For example, Benkler (2002) studied the phenomenon of "commons-based peer production" that is characterized by "large-scale collaboration in many information production fields … in the digitally networked environment without reliance either on markets or managerial hierarchy" (Benkler 2002: 374) . His survey of the fields include NASA Clickworkers, K5, online games, the system in Amazon to rate books, Google's rating of web sites, Slashdot, Napster, and many others. In our view, they represent to different degrees open institutions that have been emerging due to the development of information technology. In this paper, we focus on four different fields as typical examples of open institutions in order to obtain some general conclusions about this fundamental institutional structure.
In the present paper we submit a general definition of open institutional structure. In contrast to conventional institutional and property rights theories that focus on transaction and contract, we argue that open institutional structure is really about production. Our approach obviously implies a positive view on externality and uncertainty.
In analyzing the economic reasons for open institutions, we focus on three basic aspects:
(1) the final product of open institutions; (2) integration of consumers into production; (3) We argue that what is produced by open institutions must be a collective good, with no clear direction for the final product and relying on highly variable human-related input.
Integration of consumers into production is a necessary condition. It also means that the "production" commons in the sense of Fennell (2004) Lerner and Tirole (2000) think that many OSS phenomena can be explained by simple labor economics. In particular, they argue that OSS participants may be motivated by the 2 OSS is different from shareware or free software. Shareware is only freely available in the binary form and its underlying source code is not openly accessible. Freeware (or public-domain software) has no restrictions placed on subsequent users of the source code.
following rewards: (1) fixing bugs or customizing programs for their own benefits; (2) lowering cost to programmers due to Alumni effect; (3) career concern incentive; (4) ego gratification incentive. In general, the literature largely agree that in OSS performance measurement is better and easier and the performance is more informative of talent; OSS programmers take full responsibility while within a firm their performance depends on others; capital formed in OSS is also less firm-specific but rather more human-specific. The evidence for these arguments includes the importance of user benefits, accrediting programmers and reputation to developers in open source projects.
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Existing studies on OSS often focus on its different aspects. For example, Kuan (2001) is probably the first to formally model open-source software as a make-or-buy problem that results in the integration of consumers and producers. When users organize to produce a good for themselves, its quality will be higher than closed source software. Kuan's approach somehow simplifies the institutional structure of OSS by ignoring that the good is a collective good and its production needs collaboration of many people. In a different approach, Benkler (2002) emphasizes "commons-based peer production" in OSS that is regarded as a distinct mode from market and the firm. 
Open Science
Many researchers have noted the similarity between OSS and modern science, which is also called "open science", "public science", or even "the Republic of Science" in contrast to the 3 For a recent review and a collection of studies on OSS, see von Krogh and von Hippel (2006) . 4 Benkler's approach focuses on information economy brought about by OSS. However, first, the role of user as producer is largely ignored. Second, in spite of the well-known advantages of internet on information exchanges and flows, people can also communicate efficiently by talking to each other. That is one reason why workers and assets are often concentrated inside one physical building. Of course, there is no doubt that internet has some unmatched advantages to facilitate intra-production collaboration, but this factor is not fundamental to the structure of open institutions, especially in fields that do not produce information.
proprietary mode of developing knowledge (David 1998 Largely from the perspective of externality, Nelson (1959) discusses the relationship between basic scientific research and why few private firms, except a few with large technological base, would be expected to invest in basic research. Examining the emergence of open science from an institutional and historical perspective, David (1998) An interesting issue emerges in recent years after many governments encourage universities to patent their discoveries, especially in biomedical field. This privatization of research has certainly strengthened the incentives of scientists, but Heller & Eisenberg (1998) pointed out that privatizing "up-stream" research in biomedical field may result in anti-commons problem that is socially inefficient. Again, we see a delicate balance between proprietary mode of scientific research and the open structure.
Open Square
Cities have many public squares. An intriguing question is why squares are public? This question becomes important if we consider two issues. First, some private communities also have "private" squares in the sense that they are only accessible to residents within those communities. Second, some squares built by private parties are designed to be public. One example is the SONY Square in Berlin. Square is more valuable to the whole project than a private square.
Interestingly, when Fennell discussed tragedy of commons, she also used an example of people shopping in a downtown Main Street instead of a cheaper suburban shopping centers (Fennell 2004: 924) . Obviously, the busy, warm and livable urban atmosphere, just as described in Jacobs (1961) , provides consumers a sense of enjoyment that might be offset by higher price in a downtown street.
With the rapid development of shopping malls and shopping centers, many "private" squares inside them also gradually become a gather-together place for kids. Nevertheless, most 6 I thank Tianxin Zhang for providing this example.
visitors to these "private" squares are consumers who are shopping in the malls. This is very different from a real open square in city, where visitors may go for many different purposes and no restriction can be imposed on their accessibility. Of course, nothing is black and white; there is a degree of difference here. Many squares may not be fully open but with managed access by the public.
Open Urban Planning
Modern form of urban or city planning is also a good example of open institutions.
Before its introduction, private covenants were the major mode of land-use control (Siegan 1972; Davies 2002) . Many private deed restrictions in England were imposed by the original big landowners, usually nobility and other landed gentry (Davies 2002) . The emergence of urban planning in the early 20th century indicates the problems of private covenants in landuse control. Even some writers less begrudging of private property have noted problems with private covenants (see, for example, MacCallum, 1970) .
The rise of urban planning responded to the need for public good, especially public health and crime, in UK or to the need for solving externality problem in the US (Hall 2002 ). Deng (2003b argues that the eclipse of private covenants illustrates the impossibility of comprehensive contract.
In addition to its various technical developments, modern urban planning is characterized by voluntary public participation, a clear sense of urban commons, decision by political majority, and enforcement by police power. Its governance structure in many countries corresponds to the political hierarchy in the sense that there is also a hierarchy of planning at different spatial scales, although the strength of this relation varies in different countries. The world-wide development of modern urban planning in the early twentieth century suggests that its institutional form has some advantages over traditional proprietary mode.
The rebound of private zoning in recent decades worldwide shows that proprietary institutional structure, as complementary to open structure, has also responded to some inherent problems in modern urban planning (Deng 2003b) . These new proprietary institutional forms may represent a new trend for urban institutions (Beito, Gordon and Tabarrak 2002) .
Open Institutions Are Really about Production
A brief look across the above examples gives us some preliminary clues about open institutions. Conventional theories of property rights are almost all about transaction. Although different property rights arrangements may have different implications for production, such as this owner being better at using this property than another owner, they don't directly determine or affect the mode of production. But, open institutions are really directly about production instead of transaction. For example, OSS is not about free access to the source code, which by itself is nothing different from free copying of compiled binary codes, the final format of commercial software products. The essence of OSS is how different people can fix, improve or build upon the source codes so that a big software "project" can be achieved in a voluntary, free access environment. Kogut and Metiu (2001) pointed out that an important dimension of OSS is a production model. 7 It can be characterized as decentralized decision making (regarding who, how, when to improve on the source codes), albeit under some voluntary governance structure, and decentralized collaboration and production. In contrast, conventional production mode is characterized by centralized decision making and centralized production (in terms of people, time and space).
7 Another dimension that they refer to is public ownership of intellectual property.
Although the case of public square is less obvious, its essence is still about production.
What SONY wants in the design of the square is a social or "livable" square that includes not only the physical square but also different types of people and the random combinations of their activities in the square. In this sense, all people who visit the square also contribute to the production of this "livable" square. The product of this unintended collaboration of different people at different time is an ever changing picture or atmosphere of the square.
In this sense, peer collaboration itself is not the distinct feature of open institutions, as emphasized by Benkler (2002) . For example, Microsoft employees collaborate both formally and informally (such as by talk and other social activities) in their work places. This collaboration is based on (labor) market transactions that rely on employment contract.
Outsourcing can also be a form of collaboration that depends on commercial contract. On the contrary, in the case of Linux, people cooperate in production not due to any contract; it is often said to be based on so-called "common interest" or "commons". So, it is the voluntary and Open institutions are about production of a collective good. What is open is access to the production process. In spite of some arguments for the importance of production (Langlois and Foss 1997) , most existing studies on organizations and institutions focus on transactions. The typical approach is to minimize transaction cost, as studied by Coase (1991) , Williamson (1985) , Hart (1995) In open institutions, access should be open and free. Therefore, they are contrary to property rights in the sense that they are not dependent on any proprietary mode of production or transaction. "Open-source development exists because, once property rights are removed from consideration, in-house production is often revealed as less efficient" (Kogut and Metiu 2001:249) . One issue merits clarification. Open institutions do not necessarily imply fragmentation of property because there is no role of property rights at all. 8 Hence, many traditional discussions on externality, which arise due to fragmented property rights and could potentially be mitigated by various property rights arrangements (Coase 1960) , are not very helpful here because externality is not regarded as a problem but rather an important source of productivity in the open structure mode.
Open institutions are also contrary to contract, which is used to facilitate transactions in a world of property rights. There is no doubt of the importance of contract in modern market economy. The question is why we need an institutional arrangement that does not rely on contract or even transaction.
In light of the above discussions, the definition of open institutional structure includes the following elements:
Open access to the production process (including decision making and production) for a collective good.
No property rights or proprietary rules.
No contract is involved in the "open" process. Voluntary participation.
8 Fennell (2004) has a good discussion of the reasons and consequences of property fragmentation. She identified some positive reasons for fragmentation: (1) fragmentation may be important for people to relinquish power over the resource without actually transferring the power or property; (2) it might be a way to temporarily force the negotiation to spread over people or generations, during which more information can be collected and information asymmetry could be avoided.
Consumers are also producers, i.e., the integration of consumer and producer.
According 
Collective Good
It is almost common sense that open institutions are related to collective good as the term "commons" is often used in the related research. case of open science. Third, if the final product has clear direction then it will be easy to organize its production through contract, the main transactional format in a proprietary world. In other words, the proprietary mode will be more efficient than open institutional structure.
The unpredictability or variability of its final product implies that production in open institutions must be highly human specific and decentralized. For information product and especially its variability, which is the primary source of efficiency gains for OSS, many researchers have noted the central role of human capital in its production (Benkler 2002) . The highly variable nature of human capital is the source of innovation and creativity. Whenever human-related input to the production is not highly variable, then proprietary mode may become more efficient. A good example is urban planning and private community. When the population in a community (or city) is highly heterogeneous, as in most cities around the world, "open" urban planning is the dominant form. When the community becomes very homogeneous due to either smaller size or Tieboutian sorting, we see the rebound of private community that is based on property rights (Deng 2003b) . Second, integration of consumers into production can guarantee that there are some private benefits to at least those consumers of high performance in contribution. As Olson (1965) suggests, there must be some private benefits to group members since the incentive for their participation will otherwise be too low to sustain. Given the absence of monetary incentive within open institutional structure, integration of consumers and producers can help to provide some direct non-monetary incentives such as fixing bugs, customizing programs, and even reputation and career incentives. Lerner and Tirole (2000) listed some private rewards to OSS participants that fit into simple labor economics. In their empirical studies on the factors that determine the scope of open source licensing, they found that restrictive licenses are more common for applications geared toward end-users and less likely for those oriented toward developers (Lerner and Tirole 2005) . 10 In other words, open source licensing tends to be more open and less commercial when the consumers are more integrated into production. In open planning, many have observed that the most active participants in planning process are those homeowners whose property values may be directly affected by planning. Their motivation may be due to rent capitalization (Fischel 2001) or the political hold-up problem (Deng 2003a ).
Third, the integration of consumers and producers is to some extent similar to "userdriven innovation" in some industries such as machine tool instruments and scientific instruments (von Hippel 1988) . This shows the importance of highly variable human capital and creativity to open institutions. Human capital is certainly related to consumer's experience of using the product. In the case of open planning, only local residents who will be most affected have the best local knowledge that is vital for a good plan. In OSS, users are more familiar with the features and problems of the software and, hence, are better at designing and improving the software. For example, Kogut and Metiu (2001) noted an efficiency gain from OSS model is concurrent debugging and design. Kuan's (2001) empirical study also points to the efficiency of OSS in debugging code. She built a formal model that analyzes consumer's choice between commercial software and adapting open source code to his or her own use. She found that the quality of OSS can be expected to be higher than their commercial counterparts.
Anti-commons Problem
We In recent years the academic interest in anticommons problem has surged in analyzing various problems resulted from the fragmentation of property rights (Heller 1998; Buchanan and Yoon 2000) . Simply put, the commons problem is due to "the right to use significantly exceeds the effective right (or power) to exclude others", while in anticommons problem, "the coowners' right of use is mitigated, and potentially eliminated, by an eclipsing right of exclusion held by competing co-owners" (Parisi, Schulz and Depoorter 2004:176) . Tragedy of commons and tragedy of anticommons are often regarded as duality (Buchanan and Yoon 2000) .
In a well-thought paper, Fennell (2004) tries to synthesize them instead of treating them as dichotomous problems. She uses an umbrella term "common interest tragedy" for both the tragedy of commons and the tragedy of anticommons, and suggests two basic requirements to identify a common interest tragedy. First, the individuals must fail to internalize all the costs or benefits of their actions. In other words, there must be externalities in using the resource.
Second, the total returns to the group must be larger in the case of cooperative action than in the case of defecting action. Most importantly, Fennell (2004) points out the connection between the tragedy of commons and the tragedy of anticommons by noting that, in addition to the fixed common resource, there is another "commons" that is relevant to the participants' payouts-the resource-gathering environment. This is in the same spirit as our emphasis on the production benefits associated with open institutions. is often so hard to get them back together. (Fennell 2004: 936) Hypothesis 3: given the convergence of commons and anticommons in the sense of Fennell (2004) , open institutions are most efficient when the "production" commons is more important and the tragedy of anticommons becomes a serious problem in proprietary mode.
The "production" commons is the total gains when the group members cooperate in production, in whatever sense, instead of pursuing fragmentary interests in non-cooperative actions, which can result in the tragedy of commons. When the total gains from the "production" commons are significant, then the tragedy of anticommons that is associated with the "production" commons in a proprietary world will become a serious concern. The reason why "production" commons is very important for open institutions is its integration of consumers into production. If they are separate, then the tragedy of commons may be an important issue for the consumers who simply consume the final product, a collective good. Then, the tragedy of anticommons may not be an issue at all because there is no possibility for them to get involved in the production process. The issue of "production" commons is not very realistic or meaningful in this case. It is exactly due to the integration of consumers and producers that open institutions are related to the tragedies of commons, especially the "production" commons.
Open institutions are an antidote to the tragedy of anticommons because property rights are removed from the problem. Even in the Russian example as told by Heller (1998) , it was the de facto property rights held by some interest groups that blocked the reform. In the case of software, proprietary firm tends to hold technological secrets in order to obtain more rent, but this prevents those technological "secrets" from being used by other firms. The owner has the incentive to dig in by increasing firm-specific capital, which leads to the hold-up problem or the anti-commons problem. 12 In contrast, "using open source technology encourages users that they will not be 'held up' by a future price increase after adopting a technology and that they will always be able to tailor their technology to their own particular needs" (Lerner and Tirole 2005:115) . Participation in OSS increases human-specific capital instead of firm-specific capital.
The former would not cause anticommons problem due to the (voluntary) structure of open institutions. People who object to participating in the production commons are either vetoed (as in a political process) or allowed to exit voluntarily. In this case, the "production" commons is what could be achieved for the whole society by moving beyond simple universal access toward technological innovations.
Conceptually, in the case of software, there might be two ways to solve the anticommons problem. One way is to integrate all production processes and workers within one firm, such as in Microsoft. Theoretically, there is no anti-commons problem within the firm because no worker owns the source code and they have to follow the instructions from the governance hierarchy. But, Lerner & Tirole (2000) consumers are still integrated into production, albeit specified ex ante. However, one or a group of those employees or service firms may some day refuse to participate in the "production"
process by holding up on some firm-specific or human-specific capital. In the presence of this type of anticommons problem, the final product will not be complete. Obviously, the open structure of the square helps to avoid the potential anticommons problem.
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The rise of modern open (and public) urban planning is also a good example to illustrate the function of open institutions to mitigate the anticommons problem. The problems of public health, security and so on in pre-twentieth century cities were mostly due to the failure of traditional land use controls, namely private covenants, to involve more people to take collective actions. On the one hand, multilateral contracting is difficult; on the other hand, a livable and growing city makes the proprietary mode difficult to cope with the uncertainty, variability and even randomness (Deng 2003b What is produced by open institutions is a collective good with no clear direction for the final product and relying on highly variable human-related input. Integration of consumers into production is a necessary condition for effective participation and product quality in open institutions. Integration of consumers and producers also means that the "production" commons is more important in the sense of Fennell (2004) . Given the anticommons problem related to the "production" commons in a proprietary world, open institutions can effectively get around the anticommons problem that prevent people from collaborating to achieve a better commons.
There are also some fundamental issues about open institutional structure that deserve more discussion. First, many popular arguments about open institutions are normative in nature.
This is most obvious in the debate about OSS. Words like "freedom" are flying everywhere.
The nature of open institutions is indeed about freedom and voluntary participation. In this sense, open institutional structure may also have an inherent normative objective. Another aspect is equity, which is usually mentioned in contrary to commercial interest. For example, many think that proprietary format may be morally offensive to some people, especially those in fields that require high creativity. "[P]rivate claims to intellectual property right are often seen as morally offensive owing to their distributional consequences and the fact that excluded groups are deprived of the benefits" (Kogut and Metiu 2001:251) . All these normative arguments should not be ignored in our analysis.
In a sense, open institutional structure is an efficient institutional form for the problem of externality. Many economists have found that the concept of externality is more difficult to be employed for analysis than that of public good or collective good (Cheung 1970) . Given that most traditional studies more or less focus on proprietary mode and rely heavily on concepts like contract, firm and property, we think the reason for this analytical difficulty of externality is that the proprietary structure is inherently not a good institutional vehicle for dealing with widespread, would argue that the relationship between these two fundamental institutional structures is parallel to that between commons and anticommons. In situations where the tragedy of anticommons become a serious problem, open institutions is more efficient by avoiding various problems imbedded in property rights and contract; when the tragedy of commons become the concern, proprietary mode is better by leaving the production to an owner who retains all residual surplus. The latter manifests best in the growth of various forms of private communities .
Many institutional studies (see, for example, Williamson 1985; Barzel 1989; Coase 1991; North 1991; Hart 1995) have shown that various institutional and property rights arrangements based on the proprietary structure evolve to deal with various problems from uncertainty.
According to that perspective, uncertainty is regarded as negative (to transaction and its 
